Thoughts on the Nature and Consequences of Ungoverned Spaces by Taylor, A.J.
1 
 
Thoughts on the Nature and Consequences of Ungoverned Spaces 
Andrew J. Taylor
1
 
 
Since the 1990s, ungoverned spaces have increasingly been seen as a source of 
serious instability and threat in the international system. Society regards ungoverned 
spaces as the absence of a state as the authoritative allocator of value, provider of 
collective goods, and as the holder of a monopoly of legitimate coercion. The obvious 
remedy, then, is state building. This apparently simple formulation obscures the 
complexity and variability of ungoverned spaces and the reason for their emergence. 
Moreover, this ignores the fact that ungoverned spaces may lack government but not 
governance. Ungoverned spaces can pose a security threat, but terrorist groups are 
rarely responsible for their creation; the reason for their emergence is poor 
governance that prompts the populations in these areas to render themselves 
ungovernable by the existing central state. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Land and territory are so closely associated with the notion of the state they are seldom 
analyzed separately. This is surprising given that the planet, apart from a few areas such as 
the Arctic, overwhelmingly divides into sovereign national territories,
1
 and that the state 
remains the world’s preeminent political association. This ubiquity and visibility helps 
explain why the concept of ungoverned territory seems so worrisome. This paper seeks to 
frame the concept of ungoverned spaces at an overarching level through three parts: the first 
considers its definition; the second explores the relationship between sovereignty, 
territoriality, and statehood; and the third importantly asks: do ungoverned territories pose a 
serious security threat? This paper’s central contention is that ungoverned spaces can pose a 
significant security threat but that terrorist groups (for example) are seldom, if ever, 
responsible for the creation of these spaces. At the heart of the problem lies poor governance 
that leads the populations of these spaces to render themselves ungovernable by the existing 
central state. 
 
 
Definition 
 
Studies of ungoverned territory have been—and remain—strongly influenced by the state 
failure literature that emerged in the 1990s.
2
 The RAND Corporation’s definition, for 
example, derives from—and constitutes a part of—this discourse: “Ungoverned territories 
can be failed or failing states; poorly controlled land or maritime borders or airspace; or areas 
within otherwise viable states where the central government’s authority does not extend.”3 In 
this context, the concept of the ungoverned space is inherent in doctrines in 
counterinsurgency; counterterrorism; counternarcotics; stabilization and reconstruction; and 
peace building.
4
 In turn, political scientists tend to invariably equate ungoverned areas with 
“security threat” and all that it implies. A more inclusive definition of ungoverned territory 
by the US Department of Defense—albeit one still influenced strongly by the state failure 
thesis—holds that an ungoverned space is, 
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A place where the state or central government is unable or unwilling to extend control, 
effectively govern, or influence the local population, and where a provincial, local, 
tribal or autonomous government does not fully or effectively govern, due to 
inadequate governance capacity, insufficient political will, gaps in legitimacy, the 
presence of conflict, or restrictive norms of behavior. “Ungoverned areas” should be 
assumed to include under-governed, ill-governed, contested, and exploitable areas.
5
 
 
From local to global, the concept of politics finds grounding in a territorial imperative, which 
holds that historically territorially grounded organizations—particularly the state—define 
rights over a territory. Territoriality is inherent in state sovereignty over a geographical 
domain. Thus, at its simplest construct, state sovereignty equates to control of territory. Both 
RAND’s definition and the one cited above testify eloquently that the discussion of 
ungoverned areas frequently raises more questions than it answers. For example: who 
determines ownership? How is control defined and measured? What attributes render 
ownership viable? Is ownership ever unambiguous?  
In a real sense, “ungoverned” is a misnomer. Political scientist Marina Ottaway 
describes state (re)construction as a transition from de jure to de facto statehood.
6
 In a world 
where a state (or states) claims just about every piece of land, we remain concerned with the 
consequences created by a territory’s lacking a single and sovereign central government. 
Here, then, ungoverned areas are “a concept not about threats that emerge from the absence 
of governance, but about certain potential threats that emerge from the way a place is 
governed.”7 Political philosopher David Miller, for example, posits a triangular relationship 
between a land, its residents, and a set of political institutions, whose usual configuration is 
the national sovereign state but which can generate configurations of land, people and 
institutions different from the consolidated national-territorial sovereign state.
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 Importantly 
for Miller, therefore, a territorial entity need not wield jurisdictional authority (in the sense of 
being recognised by other similar entities and its people as the legitimate authority) but still 
possess many of the appurtenances of statehood; it is also, moreover, a matter of debate 
whether jurisdictional authority lies with the state (state sovereignty) or the people (popular 
sovereignty).  
However, the dominant perception and claim among political scientists remains that 
the state is indispensible, and that its absence conjures images of a Hobbesian anarchy.
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“Ungoverned” brings with its train powerful overtones of threat, instability, and insecurity, as 
well as the sense that an ungoverned space is something the affected territory and 
international state system should avoid at virtually any cost. Yet, the absence of government 
does not necessarily imply the absence of governance. Contested and disputed territories will 
have governance. Admittedly, this governance may not be very attractive. In fact, since the 
mid-1990s, the international community has identified “hybrid political orders,” “state-like 
entities,” “proto-states,” and “actually existing governance” as breeding grounds for security 
threats.
10
 For example, in multiple national security strategy documents and speeches 
President Clinton noted the trend that grave, even existential, threats could and were 
emerging from ungoverned and poorly governed states. This diagnosis, although originally 
rejected by his successor, became a driver of United States and global foreign policy trends 
post-September 11, 2001.
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 Therefore, many perceive so-called ungoverned spaces as a 
significant global “other” about which something must be done. 
 
Sovereignty, Territoriality, and Statehood 
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Max Weber argued a state’s definition must consist of its unique features as a political 
association, namely its relationship with coercion and territory. Specifically, Weber defined 
the state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate 
use of physical force within a given territory.”12 In contrast, Article 1 of the Montevideo 
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933) defines the state “as a person in 
international law [possessing] ... (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) 
government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other States.” These two definitions 
immediately raise questions of territoriality, particularly what happens when a state’s 
monopoly of legitimate force does not run throughout its territory. Weber’s state is the sole 
claimant of legitimate authority in a territory, delineated from other states by mutually 
recognised borders. For Weber, therefore, an association claiming statehood must 
demonstrate—and not simply claim—that it maintains its borders and controls its territory. 
Loss of control over territory can result in secession or the formation of quasi-independent 
fiefdoms or statelets (entities with some of the attributes of a state, notably territorial control, 
created by the dissolution of a larger state) by those hostile to central government.
13
 
Recognized borders define states, but the degree of territorial control typically associated 
with the state is of relatively recent historical origin; “fuzzy” boundaries are the basis of 
ungoverned spaces.
14
 “Fuzzy” territoriality and an inability to control territory draws us back 
to why ungoverned space is defined as a security threat.   
The threat unattached territory poses to international stability has long been 
recognised in international law. Throughout history, the principle uti possidetis juris (as you 
possess under law), which means that prior internal administrative boundaries become 
international boundaries, has generally applied in international relations and international law, 
in part for the laudable aim of avoiding territory-motivated conflict. However, in practice 
many situations have arisen where established boundaries have little or no linguistic and 
ethnic relevance. Thus the right of self-determination creates potential for conflict based on 
territorially geographically concentrated disaffected minorities.
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 Robert Jackson, for 
example, has suggested that frozen borders are a major cause of conflict, 
Those inherited borders became sacrosanct and border changes correspondingly 
difficult. The right to territorial conquest was extinguished along with the right of 
colonization. The practice of territorial partition was almost universally regarded 
with misgivings…. Threats or acts of secession or irredentism were similarly treated 
with suspicion and were universally opposed.
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The changes outlined above meant that many of the states produced by the dissolution of 
formal empires retained jurisdictional and geographical existence in the absence of a 
dominant central government—and therefore the presence of ungoverned spaces. This 
tendency reflects an uneasy coexistence between competing types of sovereignty in a 
particular territorial area, namely international-legal sovereignty and the absence (or 
weakness) of domestic sovereignty.
17
   
The globe formally divides into “peer polities,” namely states that interact with one 
another according to shared principles and norms relating to domestic and international 
sovereignty and which focus on the inviolability of borders and freedom from external 
interference in a state’s domestic affairs, and whose interactions are not determined by a 
single, dominant actor. However, despite formal equality across these polities, not all states 
within themselves are equal in either power or effectiveness.
18
 This brings us to the question 
of statehood. 
Central to thinking about the relationship between the state, territory, and control is 
that a state must deliver a minimal level of functions and collective goods, notably 
maintaining order and an effective government capable of retaining a claim to rule the 
contiguous territory. This is statehood, or consolidated statehood. It rests on the exercise of 
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internal and external sovereignty; the possession of legitimacy and authority; a monopoly of 
armed force; and, more debatably, on institutional and normative restraints on the exercise of 
government power.
19
 The core assumption is that an ability to make, implement, and enforce 
authoritative decisions throughout a territory is fundamental, and the remedy for any political 
association failing to do so is state building. Historically and globally, consolidated statehood 
is of relatively recent emergence. Historically, limited statehood has been more common. 
Inherent in limited statehood is the feature of ungoverned spaces, where the government’s 
writ does not extend.  
This implies a causal chain underpinning a claim to statehood. First, the right to make 
rules flows from effective control of territory. Who holds the right to govern a territory is 
frequently the outcome of violent political competition. Second, the linking of a state’s right 
to govern a territory free from external intervention leads to a status quo bias which means 
that when a state has demonstrated control, it is legitimate for the state to resist challenges 
and for it to call other states to support it in its efforts. These are, of course, key features of 
the Charter of the United Nations. It is irrelevant that alternative groups within a territory 
challenging the state might be better at governing that territory and its people. Thus, 
challenges to territorial control should be resisted and only if the state is utterly incompetent 
(i.e., failed or collapsed) do other considerations, such as how to respond, become operative. 
However, determining when a state is incompetent, failed, or collapsed is difficult to 
determine, as has been demonstrated with respect to the supposed Responsibility to Protect 
whose overall effect seems to have been to reinforce, not reduce, national state sovereignty.
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This leads to two conclusions: (1) if a state is not effective, and this is liable to lead to areas 
of a set territory coming under the control of non-state actors, the state’s territorial right 
comes into question; and (2) any group able to impose order or demonstrate effectiveness 
could gain territorial right in a given area, which raises the possibility of a “might is right” 
argument that is contrary to international law.
21
  
Addressing the problem of ungoverned space is neither easy nor straightforward. 
Conflicts such those in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen invariably were 
characterised by, facilitated, or were even caused by, external intervention and have served to 
emphasise the scale of the challenge posed by ungoverned spaces. Rebuilding central state 
capacity is seldom an adequate answer, as central government (and its actions) is usually a 
major reason why these areas became ungovernable and external intervention or involvement 
is likely to provoke a powerful counter response from within the affected state. Western 
states and their public opinions (who whilst demanding security have become increasingly 
sceptical about state building) have shown that they neither have the resources or political 
will to sustain long-term state building, and that their actions tend to exacerbate already 
adverse conditions. Moreover, existing unofficial forms of government in these spaces may 
be in better positions to achieve order and more effective at addressing the local population’s 
needs than the “official” government.  
Sheer political complexity nullifies simple solutions that exclude the existing state. 
The Department of Defense report on ungoverned areas noted, “For diplomatic, legal, and 
practical reasons, the local state cannot be ignored or bypassed, but nor should it be permitted 
to impede progress against safe havens when other entities are positioned to help.”22 Thus, 
“Legitimacy without capacity is unproductive. Capacity without legitimacy is 
counterproductive... with respect to illicit actors: Efforts to reduce their capacity to operate 
are more effective when bolstered by efforts to reduce their legitimacy in the eyes of key 
populations.”23 Moreover, the concept “ungoverned” is relative, rather than absolute. To 
further complicate the matter, there are degrees of “ungoverned-ness,” including: exploitable 
areas, contested areas, misgoverned areas, under-governed areas and, the most extreme case, 
ungoverned areas. The ungoverned areas report captured the problem, 
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A weak, failed, or collapsed state performs none of its governance functions 
effectively in a given area, freeing illicit actors to pursue threatening activities ... All 
ungoverned areas have the potential to become comprehensive safe havens, but not 
all them do; those ungoverned areas that do become safe havens, many are exploited 
not by transnational illicit actors but by groups whose activities and interests remain 
strictly local.
24
 
The diagnosis above points directly to the potential security issues raised by ungoverned 
spaces and prompts the question: do ungoverned areas constitute an external security threat? 
 
 
Ungoverned Areas: So What? 
 
Many governments perceive ungoverned territories as a security threat because the borders of 
weak, or failing, states can produce spillover effects, with turmoil spreading like an ink-blot. 
As state capacities are challenged, withdrawn, or ejected, porosity created by these conditions 
tends to promulgate further turmoil and ungovernability. This occurred in West Africa during 
the 1990s when the Liberian conflict metastasised, undermining Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, and 
Sierra Leone. “Bad neighborhoods,” areas characterised by an absence of order and stability, 
can encourage failure in vulnerable states. More specifically, shared borders can transmit 
unrest from a singular ungoverned space to neighboring states whereby affiliations that 
challenge the state create transborder territorial networks based on ethnicity, political affinity, 
or economic self-interest. In some cases, the resulting multinational networks resemble proto-
states. 
Ungoverned spaces pose different degrees of threat. Those that harbour terrorism 
associated with global jihadism; provide bases for non-jihadi terrorism and criminal networks; 
and which are areas of humanitarian crisis prove to be the most threatening. It is also the case 
that a humanitarian crisis could precipitate a process that moves beyond a population 
criticizing the ineffectiveness of the present state to one that seeks to supplant the present 
state leadership. The 2007 RAND study “Ungoverned Territories” contains case studies of 
eight regions with seeming potential to become terrorist sanctions: the Pakistan-Afghanistan 
Border, the Arabian Peninsula, the Sulawesi-Mindanao Arc, the East African Corridor, West 
Africa, the North Caucasus, the Colombia-Venezuela Border, and the Guatemala-Chiapas 
Border. In the report, RAND explores ungoverned territories through two dimensions: 
ungovernability and conduciveness to terrorism. 
The piece measures governability using four indicators: the level of state penetration 
into society, the extent to which the state retains a monopoly of force, the extent to which the 
state can control its borders, and whether the area is vulnerable to external intervention. It 
measures ungovernability by the malfunctioning or non-functioning of state institutions, 
which indicates: potential vacuums for other forces to fill; the degree of local compliance 
with national law; the degree of collaboration with the state by potentially disaffected groups; 
and the extent of local acceptance of state legitimacy. Common to all these dimensions is 
authority. Social and cultural resistance to the central state—a preference for institutions that 
accord with local conditions—and the organization of alternative instruments of coercion 
indicate a rejection of state authority and the possibility of a “shadow state,” possibly with the 
support and encouragement of outside actors.
25
 None of this means an ungoverned territory 
will become a security threat. Whether or not a territory becomes a security threat depends on 
its attractiveness and viability as a base for terrorist groups.  
In addition, RAND’s “Ungoverned Territories” identifies four variables that influence 
whether an area is “conducive” to terrorist exploitation. They are: adequacy of infrastructure 
and operational access (for instance: communications, official or unofficial banking, or 
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transport); sources of income (from, for instance: drugs, human trafficking, diamonds, or 
piracy), favourable demographic and social characteristics (success depends on some popular 
support or acquiescence often reinforced by a history of conflict with the center); and 
invisibility (pertaining to being physically inhospitable and geographically remote). These 
areas may display complex governance, as when the criminal networks and terrorist or 
insurgent networks render them indistinguishable and the former provide support and revenue 
in return for security and protection. The development of non-state governance shows why 
ungoverned territories can be used to explore processes of state formation, which can be 
captured by the shift from Mancur Olson’s “mobile” to “stationary” bandits.26 Terrorists and 
insurgents can be defeated only if found. The difficulties of so doing are amplified if these 
individuals are capable of “disappearing” into ungoverned (often trans-border) regions.27 This 
leaves open the question of whether terrorist and insurgent groups are a cause or a symptom 
of ungoverned spaces. 
The “Ungoverned Territories” case studies support a typology of outcomes, each of 
which implies different responses. First, “contested governance” is where a group rejects the 
legitimacy of a government’s rule and pledges loyalty to another political association, such as 
an insurgent movement or clan. Second is “incomplete governance,” where a state aspires to 
assert its authority, but lacks the resources to produce necessary collective goods. Third is 
“abdicated governance,” which is where central government abdicates its role as provider of 
collective goods, deeming that attempting to maintain an effective presence is neither cost-
effective nor politically desirable.
28
 The dividing lines between these are indistinct, but 
nevertheless the categories are reasonable and implicate the difficulty of formulating an 
effective response to weaknesses of territoriality. The obvious response is state building, but 
that response raises as many questions as it answers.  
Ungoverned territories score high on the presence of local armed groups and having a 
relative absence of state institutions; they show a lack of border control, a key factor in 
explaining their existence and nature. This is hardly unexpected. Supportive social norms are 
particularly important in stimulating and sustaining the resilience of alternative political 
structures in areas of contested governance. The analysis of ungoverned spaces often attempts 
to distinguish between cases where ungovernability derives less from local resistance than 
from central state neglect or incompetence, with the latter being easier to address than the 
former. However, the two tend to go hand in hand. Ungoverned territories can be governed 
by a “shadow-state” that displays the appurtenances of a state except juridical sovereignty. 
Thus, tension between de facto and de jure sovereignty poses a major conundrum when 
developing responses to ungoverned spaces. Should external actors support the legal but 
ineffective central quasi-state or the effective but illegal quasi-state?  
Ungoverned spaces—perceived as anarchic zones outside formal state control that 
constituted a security threat—was a well-established narrative by 2000, but received an 
additional infusion of focus with the occurrence of September 11, 2001. The “9/11 
Commission Report” reflected this, noting that: 
To find sanctuary, terrorist organizations have fled to some of the least governed, 
most lawless places in the world... areas ones that combine rugged terrain, weak 
government, room to hide or receive supplies, and low population density with a 
town or city near enough to allow necessary interaction with the outside world.
29
 
In response to this emerging consensus, scholar Stewart M. Patrick made three key 
observations about the security implications of ungoverned spaces. First, a focus on 
geographical remoteness ignores the significance of large, teeming cities with poor 
governance for anonymity, as well as the necessity of infrastructural access for terrorist 
recruitment, organisation, propaganda, and funding. Second, truly anarchic environments 
pose serious obstacles to terrorist groups, and these significantly increased the costs of 
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operating in these environments. Third, ungoverned spaces are not voids that terrorists could 
simply fill; they are political spaces that require such groups engage with to win the 
support—or at least acquiescence—of local power-holders. Certainly, terrorists can take 
advantage of alternative political orders, creating local and tactical alliances to secure these 
locations but “fixing” these groups territorially necessarily opens them to easier attack and 
they become vulnerable to shifting loyalties and alliances.
30
 It cannot be denied that poorly 
governed or ungoverned spaces can, and do, host terrorist threats. However, these threats 
alone are not the creating source of spaces lacking governance. Rather, governance issues are 
the result of specific historical, cultural and geopolitical factors and these spaces exist 
“because the inhabitants make themselves ungovernable from the capital.”31 The most 
pertinent question for analysts, therefore, is not the degree or quality of governance, but more 
aptly “the manner of governance: Who is, and who is not, governing an area, and what are 
the consequences of the particular way they govern?”32 Not all ungoverned areas constitute a 
security threat. When they do, those most directly affected are those who live there, 
something that governments often forget. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Linkage between territorial integrity and sovereignty—both internal and external—becomes 
significant because of the problems posed by political and territorial fragmentation in a world 
of states. Territories are complex, and a major component of statecraft is about containing the 
inevitable centrifugal tendencies of statehood. Ungoverned space is, at least in part, space 
where centrifugal are greater than centripetal forces. Maintaining cohesion too often 
degenerates into coercion, thereby accelerating fragmentation and frequently ultimately to 
dissolution of existing governance. This tendency of ungoverned spaces is characteristic of a 
significant subset of national states. It cannot be ignored. 
However, state death is a rarity.
33
 Indeed, we have been living through a major period 
of state creation. Whatever the scale of their internal problems, states as bounded territories 
are seldom absorbed by their neighbors. They are far more likely to split and form new states. 
However, most usually the states continue in existence. This is the product of Westphalian 
sovereignty and the peremptory norms of international law, developments powerfully 
reinforced by decolonization and the UN system. Yet states within this system are not equally 
powerful or effective, leading to the emergence of quasi-states, several of which have been 
characterized as failed states, from which spring the threat of ungoverned spaces.  States 
displaying the trappings of external sovereignty, but whose internal sovereignty has 
fragmented, are perceived as a threat to international order. Events in the 1990s such as the 
break-up of Yugoslavia, the collapse in Somalia, and the Rwandan genocide, led to attempts 
to render sovereignty more conditional; broadened responses such that humanitarian 
intervention morphed into state building; and new doctrines to deal with the problems and 
consequences, real and perceived, of the ungoverned space. The legal efforts of the Badinter 
Committee with respect to Yugoslavia aimed at avoiding the creation of ungoverned space.
34
 
The purpose of sovereign power is the management of centrifugal tendencies; all 
polities have internal divisions, but these do not always lead to ungoverned space. What 
characterizes the failed state is territorial fragmentation to a degree that impairs its ability to 
act domestically and internationally. The failed state and ungoverned space forms a subset of 
states—jurisdictionally sovereign but internally fragmented—that constitute a perceived 
threat to international order that poses serious problems for those addressing ungoverned 
spaces.  
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